Revisiting Membership Inference Under Realistic Assumptions by Jayaraman, Bargav et al.
Revisiting Membership Inference
Under Realistic Assumptions
Bargav Jayaraman
Department of Computer Science
University of Virginia
Lingxiao Wang
Department of Computer Science
University of California Los Angeles
David Evans
Department of Computer Science
University of Virginia
Quanquan Gu
Department of Computer Science
University of California Los Angeles
Abstract
Membership inference attacks on models trained using machine learning have been
shown to pose significant privacy risks. However, previous works on member-
ship inference assume a balanced prior distribution where the adversary randomly
chooses target records from a pool that has equal numbers of members and non-
members. Such an assumption of balanced prior is unrealistic in practical scenarios.
This paper studies membership inference attacks under more realistic assumptions.
First, we consider skewed priors where a non-member is more likely to occur than
a member record. For this, we use metric based on positive predictive value (PPV)
in conjunction with membership advantage for privacy leakage evaluation, since
PPV considers the prior. Second, we consider adversaries that can select inference
thresholds according to their attack goals. For this, we develop a threshold selection
procedure that improves inference attacks. We also propose a new membership
inference attack called Merlin which outperforms previous attacks. Our experi-
mental evaluation shows that while models trained without privacy mechanisms
are vulnerable to membership inference attacks in balanced prior settings, there
appears to be negligible privacy risk in the skewed prior setting.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy has become the gold standard for performing any privacy-preserving statistical
analysis over sensitive data. The privacy and utility trade-off is controlled by the privacy budget
parameter  (and failure probability δ) such that smaller privacy budgets provide stronger privacy
guarantees, whereas increasing budgets allows for more accurate results. Differentially private
versions of many simple convex machine learning algorithms have been proposed in literature that
consume a small privacy budget ( < 1) without sacrificing the model accuracy. These include
empirical risk minimization algorithms such as logistic regression, linear regression and support
vector machines [Chaudhuri et al., 2011, Zhang et al., 2012, Jain and Thakurta, 2013, Jayaraman
et al., 2018]. Differentially private deep learning, however, still requires large  values for performing
meaningful learning. Some of the earlier works required  in the order of hundreds [Zhao et al., 2018]
to even millions [Shokri and Shmatikov, 2015]. Recent works have brought  values down to single
digits [Abadi et al., 2016, Beaulieu-Jones et al., 2018, Geyer et al., 2017, Bhowmick et al., 2018,
Hynes et al., 2018] by exploiting theoretical advances in composition analysis of differential private
mechanisms [Abadi et al., 2016, Dwork and Rothblum, 2016, Bun and Steinke, 2016, Mironov,
2017]. While it is a well known fact that larger privacy budgets lead to more leakage, it is still an
open question how low privacy budgets should be to provide meaningful privacy in practice.
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Differential privacy provides strong bounds on the worst-case privacy loss, but do not provide
understanding of what privacy attacks could be realized in practice. Attacks, on the other hand,
provide an empirical lower bound on privacy leakage for a particular setting. Many attacks on
machine learning algorithms have been proposed that aim to infer private information about the model
or the training data. These attacks include membership inference [Shokri et al., 2017, Long et al.,
2017, Salem et al., 2019, Yeom et al., 2018], attribute inference [Fredrikson et al., 2014, 2015, Yeom
et al., 2018], property inference [Ateniese et al., 2015, Ganju et al., 2018], model stealing [Lowd and
Meek, 2005, Trame`r et al., 2016] and hyperparameter stealing [Wang and Gong, 2018, Yan et al.,
2020]. Of these, membership inference and attribute inference attacks are most directly connected to
the differential privacy definition and hence are a good basis for evaluating the privacy leakage of
differentially private mechanisms. Essentially, if the privacy budget used is small enough, then the
differentially private mechanism should be able to effectively defend against these attacks.
Several researchers have attempted to measure this privacy leakage empirically, including recent
works by Rahman et al. [2018] and Jayaraman and Evans [2019]. Rahman et al. [2018] evaluate
differentially private mechanisms against membership inference attacks and use accuracy and F-score
as privacy leakage metrics. However, they do not specify the theoretical relationship between their
privacy leakage metrics and the privacy budgets (i.e., how the metric would scale with increasing
privacy budget) necessary to gain insight as to what privacy budgets are safe even in the worst case
scenarios. Jayaraman and Evans [2019] evaluate the private mechanisms against both membership
inference and attribute inference attacks using the advantage privacy leakage metric of Yeom et al.
[2018]. This metric gives a theoretical upper bound based on the privacy budget, but it is not
representative of true privacy leakage in realistic scenarios (as we demonstrate in Section 3). Both
the above works consider a balanced prior data distribution probability and hence are not applicable
to settings where the prior probability is skewed. Liu et al. [2019] theoretically evaluate differentially
private mechanisms using a hypothesis testing framework using precision, recall and F-score metrics.
They give a theoretical relationship connecting these metrics to the differential privacy parameters (
and δ) and give some insights for choosing the parameter values based on the background knowledge
of the adversary. Recently, Balle et al. [2019] provided hypothesis testing framework for analysing
the relaxed variants of differential privacy that use Re´nyi divergence. However, neither of the above
works provide empirical evaluation of privacy leakage of the private mechanisms. In another recent
work, Farokhi and Kaafar [2020] propose to use the conditional mutual information as the privacy
leakage metric and derive its upper bound based on KullbackLeibler divergence. Although they
provide a relationship between this upper bound and the privacy budget, they do not evaluate the
empirical privacy leakage in terms of the proposed metric. We provide theoretical analysis on privacy
leakage metrics and perform membership inference attacks under two realistic assumptions. Namely,
we consider prior data distribution probability and an adversary that can adaptively pick inference
thresholds based on specific attack goals.
Theoretical Contributions. Motivated by these recent developments, we aim to develop more useful
privacy metrics. Similarly to Liu et al. [2019], we adopt a hypothesis testing perspective on differential
privacy in which the adversary uses hypothesis testing on the differentially private mechanism’s
output to make inferences about its private training data. We use the recently proposed f -differential
privacy notion (see Section 2.1) to bound the privacy leakage of the mechanism. Using this hypothesis
testing framework, we tighten the theoretical bound on the advantage metric (Section 3.1). Then, we
show that this metric alone does not suffice in most realistic scenarios since it does not consider the
prior probability of the data distribution from which the adversary chooses records. We propose using
positive predictive value (PPV) in conjunction with the advantage metric as it captures this notion,
and provide a theoretical analysis of this metric (Section 3.2). We provide a threshold selection
procedure to improve the existing inference attacks and also propose our novel inference attack
that achieves higher PPV than the existing inference attacks (Section 4). Finally, we empirically
evaluate the privacy leakage of differentially private neural network algorithms using both the metrics
and find a smaller gap between theoretical and empirical leakage than the best found in prior work
(Section 6), although the empirical leakage is still not high enough to pose a privacy threat. However,
the non-private models are highly vulnerable to our inference attacks.
Summary of Findings. We perform an empirical evaluation of neural networks trained with and
without differential privacy on three multi-class data sets considering balanced and imbalanced prior
data distribution. The privacy leakage evaluation is performed via the loss-based attack of Yeom et al.
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Notation Description
D = X × Y Distribution of records with features sampled form X and labels sampled from Y
S ∼ Dn Data set S consisting of n records, sampled i.i.d. from distribution D
z ∼ S Record z is picked uniformly random from data set S
z ∼ D Record z is chosen according to the distribution D
MS Model obtained by using a learning algorithmM over data set S
A Membership inference adversary
p Probability of sampling a record from training set
γ Test-to-train set ratio, (1− p)/p
 Privacy budget of DP mechanism
δ Failure probability of DP mechanism
α False positive rate of inference adversary
β False negative rate of inference adversary
φ Decision threshold of inference adversary; also called rejection rule in hypothesis testing
Φ Cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution
Table 1: Notation
[2018], called Yeom, and our proposed Merlin attack (see Section 4.2). The results (Sections 6 and 7)
corroborate our claims:
• Non-private models are highly vulnerable to inference attacks in the balanced prior setting.
• PPV decreases as the prior gets more skewed and hence it is a more reliable metric in
imbalanced prior settings.
• Merlin achieves higher PPV than Yeom, and is a more effective attack in the settings that
matter most.
• Private models are not vulnerable to any of the attacks even for privacy budgets well above
the theoretical guarantees.
2 Differential Privacy
This section provides background on the differential privacy notions we use. Table 1 summarizes the
notations we use throughout.
Dwork et al. [2006] introduced a formal notion of privacy that provides a probabilistic information-
theoretic security guarantee:
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy). A randomized algorithmM is (, δ)-differentially private if
for any pair of neighbouring data sets S, S′ that differ by one record, and any set of outputs O,
Pr[M(S) ∈ O] ≤ ePr[M(S′) ∈ O] + δ.
Thus, the ratio of output probabilities across neighbouring data sets is bounded by the  and δ
parameters. The intuition behind this definition is to make any pairs of neighbouring data sets
indistinguishable to the adversary given the information released.
From a hypothesis testing perspective [Wasserman and Zhou, 2010, Kairouz et al., 2017, Liu et al.,
2019, Balle et al., 2019, Dong et al., 2019], the adversary can be viewed as performing the following
hypothesis testing problem given the ouput of eitherM(S) orM(S′):
H0 : the underlying data set is S,
H1 : the underlying data set is S′.
According to the definition of differential privacy, given the information released by the private
algorithmM, the hardness of this hypothesis testing problem for the adversary is measured by the
worst-case likelihood ratio between the distributions of the outputsM(S) andM(S′). Following
Dong et al. [2019], a more natural way to characterize the hardness of this hypothesis testing problem
is its type I and type II errors and can be formulated in terms of finding a rejection rule φ which
trades off between type I and type II errors in an optimal way. In other words, for a fixed type I error
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α, the adversary tries to find a rejection rule φ that minimizes the type II error β. More specifically,
recalling the definition of trade-off function proposed in Dong et al. [2019]:
Definition 2.2 (Trade-off Function). For any two probability distributions P and Q on the same
space, the trade-off function T (P,Q) : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is defined as:
T (P,Q)(α) = inf{βφ : αφ ≤ α},
where the infimum is taken over all (measurable) rejection rules, and αφ and βφ are the type I and
type II errors for the rejection rule φ.
This definition suggests that the larger the trade-off function is, the harder the hypothesis testing
problem will be. It has been established in Dong et al. [2019] that a function f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is
a trade-off function if and only if it is convex, continuous, non-increasing, and f(x) ≤ 1 − x for
x ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, differential privacy can be reformulated as finding the trade-off function f that
limits the adversary’s hypothesis testing power, i.e., it maximizes the adversary’s type II error for any
given type I error.
2.1 f -Differential Privacy
The hypothesis testing formulation of differential privacy described above leads to the notion of
f -differential privacy [Dong et al., 2019] (f -DP) which aims to find the optimal trade-off between
type I and type II errors and will be used to derive the theoretical upper bounds of our proposed
metrics for the privacy leakage.
Definition 2.3 (f -Differential Privacy). Let f be a trade-off function. A mechanism M is f -
differentially private if for all neighbouring data sets S and S′:
T (M(S),M(S′)) ≥ f.
Note that in the above definition, we abuse the notations ofM(S) andM(S′) to represent their
corresponding distributions. For an (, δ)-differentially private algorithm, the trade-off function f,δ
is given by Lemma 2.4 (proved by Wasserman and Zhou [2010] and Kairouz et al. [2017]):
Lemma 2.4 (Wasserman and Zhou [2010], Kairouz et al. [2017]). Suppose M is an (, δ)-
differentially private algorithm, then for a false positive rate of α, the trade-off function is:
f,δ(α) = max{0, 1− δ − eα, e−(1− δ − α)}.
This lemma suggests that higher values of f,δ(α) correspond to more privacy and perfect privacy
would require f,δ(α) = 1 − α. In addition, increasing  and δ decreases f,δ(α), reflecting the
expected reduction in privacy.
2.2 Gaussian Differential Privacy
The Gaussian mechanism is one of the most popular and fundamental approaches for achieving differ-
ential privacy, especially for differentially private deep learning [Abadi et al., 2016]. More specifically,
noisy stochastic gradient descent (SGD) and noisy Adam [Andrew et al., 2019], i.e., adding Gaussian
noise (Gaussian mechanism) to SGD and Adam, are often used as the underlying private optimizers
for training neural networks with privacy guarantees. Therefore, precisely characterizing the privacy
loss of the composition of Gaussian mechanisms and deriving its sub-sampling amplification results
are of great interest. This motivates the notion of Gaussian differential privacy [Dong et al., 2019],
which belongs to the family of f -DP with a single parameter µ that defines the mean of the Gaussian
distribution.
Definition 2.5 (µ-Gaussian Differential Privacy). A mechanism M is µ-Gaussian differentially
private if for all neighbouring data sets S and S′:
T (M(S),M(S′)) ≥ Gµ,
where Gµ = T (N (0, 1),N (µ, 1)).
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In this definition, Gµ is a trade-off function and hence µ-GDP is identical to f -DP where f = Gµ.
Lemma 2.6, which is established in Dong et al. Dong et al. [2019], gives the equation for computing
Gµ:
Lemma 2.6. Given thatM is a µ-Gaussian differentially private algorithm, then for a false positive
rate of α, the trade-off function is given as:
Gµ(α) = Φ(Φ
−1(1− α)− µ),
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution.
The Gaussian mechanism for µ-GDP is given by the following theorem [Dong et al., 2019].
Theorem 2.7. A mechanismM operating on a statistic θ is µ-GDP ifM(S) = θ(S) + ζ, where
ζ ∼ N (0,∇(θ)2/µ2) and∇(θ) is the global sensitivity of θ.
We also have the relationship between µ-GDP and (, δ)-DP as follows (Corollary 2.13 in Dong et al.
[2019] and Theorem 8 in Balle and Wang [2018]):
Proposition 2.8. A mechanism is µ-GDP if and only if it is (, δ())-DP for all  ≥ 0, where
δ() = Φ
(
− 
µ
+
µ
2
)
− eΦ
(
− 
µ
− µ
2
)
.
Gaussian differential privacy supports lossless composition of mechanisms (Corollary 3.3 in Dong
et al. [2019]) and privacy amplification due to sub-sampling (Theorem 4.2 in Dong et al. [2019]).
Theorem 2.9 (Composition). The T -fold composition of µi-GDP mechanisms is
√
µ21 + · · ·+ µ2T −
GDP .
Theorem 2.10 (Sub-sampling). SupposeM is f -DP on Dm, if we applyM to a subset of samples
with sampling ratio τ = m/n ∈ [0, 1], thenM is min{fτ , f−1τ }∗∗-DP, where fτ = τf + (1− τ)Id.
The function Id is the identity function defined as Id(x) = 1− x, and min{fτ , f−1τ }∗∗ is the double
conjugate of min{fτ , f−1τ } function. Theorems 2.7, 2.9 and 2.10 can be combined to achieve GDP
for gradient perturbation based machine learning algorithms such as noisy SGD and noisy Adam. For
instance, adding standard Gaussian noise with standard deviation σ to each batch of gradients sampled
with probability τ would lead to τ
√
T (e1/σ2 − 1)-GDP for T compositions [Bu et al., 2019]. In our
experiments, we use such result to characterize the privacy loss of our private optimizers for training
differentially private neural networks, and use Proposition 2.8 to convert it into (, δ)-DP for the
purpose of comparison.
3 Measuring Privacy Leakage
To evaluate privacy leakage, we define an adversarial game inspired by Yeom et al.’s Yeom et al.
[2018]. Unlike their game which assumes a balanced prior, our game factors in the prior membership
distribution probability. The adversarial game models the scenario where an adversary has access to a
model,MS , trained over a data set S, knowledge of the training procedure and data distribution, and
wishes to infer whether a given input is a member of that training set.
Experiment 3.1 (Membership Experiment). Assume a membership adversary, A, who has informa-
tion about the training data set size n, the distribution D from which the data set is sampled, and the
prior membership probability p. The adversary runs the following experiment:
1. Sample a training set S ∼ Dn and train a modelMS over the training set S.
2. Randomly sample b ∈ {0, 1}, such that b = 1 with probability p.
3. If b = 1, then sample z ∼ S; otherwise sample z ∼ D\S.
4. Output 1 if A(z,MS , n,D) = b; otherwise output 0.
This membership experiment has two notable differences from the setting of Yeom et al. Yeom et al.
[2018]. First, we consider a stronger adversary that differentiates a member of training set (z ∼ S)
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Figure 1: Theoretical upper bounds on AdvA(α) metric for various privacy budgets with varying α
(δ = 10−5).
from a non-member (z ∼ D\S), as opposed to differentiating a member (z ∼ S) from the general
data distribution (z ∼ D). Second, our experiment incorporates the prior probability p of sampling
a record, compared to the setting of Yeom et al. that assumes balanced prior probability (p = 0.5).
For most practical scenarios (that is, where being exposed as a member carries meaningful risk to
an individual), p is much smaller than 0.5. For instance, considering the scenario of an epidemic
outbreak, the training set could be the list of patients with the disease symptoms admitted at a hospital,
or a group of hospitals. The non-members can be the remaining population of the city or a district.
Hence, assuming a balanced prior of p = 0.5 is not a realistic assumption, and it is important to
develop a privacy metric that can be used to evaluate scenarios with lower priors.
3.1 Membership Advantage
The membership advantage metric, Adv , was defined by Yeom et al. [2018] as the difference between
the true positive rate and the false positive rate for the membership inference adversary provided
that p = 0.5 (i.e., balanced prior membership distribution). Yeom et al. [2018] showed that for an
-differentially private mechanism, the theoretical upper bound for membership advantage is e − 1,
which can be quite loose for higher  values and is not defined for e − 1 > 1 since the membership
advantage metric proposed by Yeom et al. [2018] is only defined between 0 and 1. Moreover, the
bound is not valid for (, δ)-differentially private algorithms which are more commonly used for
private deep learning.
We derive a tighter bound for the membership advantage metric that is applicable to (, δ)-
differentially private algorithms based on the notion of f -DP:
Theorem 3.1. LetM be an (, δ)-differentially private algorithm. For any randomly chosen record
z and fixed false positive rate α, the membership advantage of a membership inference adversary A
is bounded by:
AdvA(α) ≤ 1− f,δ(α)− α,
where f,δ(α) = max
{
0, 1− δ − eα, e−(1− δ − α)}.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The proof follows directly from Yeom at al.’s definition, AdvA(α) = TPR−
FPR when we have balanced prior membership distribution, p = 0.5. For a given FPR = α, we
have 1−TPR ≥ f,δ(α) according to the definition of trade-off function (Definition 2.2 and Lemma
2.4). Therefore, AdvA(α) ≤ 1− f,δ(α)− α.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the false positive rate α of a given membership inference ad-
versary and the upper bound of the advantage given by Theorem 3.1. This bound lies strictly between
0 and 1 and is tighter than the bound of Yeom et al. [2018], as shown in Figure 2. However, this
metric is limited to balanced prior distribution of data and hence can overestimate (or underestimate)
the privacy threat in any scenario where the prior probability is not 0.5. Thus, membership advantage
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Figure 3: Theoretical upper bounds on PPV metric for various privacy budgets (δ = 10−5).
alone is not a reliable way to measure the privacy leakage. Hence, we next propose the positive
predictive value metric that considers the prior distribution of data.
3.2 Positive Predictive Value
Positive predictive value (PPV) gives the ratio of true members predicted among all the positive
membership predictions made by an adversary (the precision of the membership adversary). For an
(, δ)-differentially private algorithm, the PPV is bounded by the following theorem:
Theorem 3.2. LetM be an (, δ)-differentially private algorithm and A be a membership inference
adversary. For any randomly chosen record z and a fixed false positive rate of α, the positive
predictive value of A is bounded by
PPVA(α, γ) ≤ 1− f,δ(α)
1− f,δ(α) + γα,
where f,δ(α) = max
{
0, 1−δ−eα, e−(1−δ−α)}, γ = (1−p)/p, and p is the prior membership
probability defined in Membership Experiment 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. According to the trade-off function definition (Definition 2.2 and Lemma 2.4),
for a given FPR = α, we have 1− TPR ≥ f,δ(α). Since PPVA(α, γ) = TP/(TP + FP ), we
can obtain:
PPVA(α, γ) =
TPR
TPR+ γ · FPR ≤
1− f,δ(α)
1− f,δ(α) + γα.
Like membership advantage, the PPV metric is strictly bounded between 0 and 1. Moreover, the
bound on PPV metric considers the prior distribution via γ, which gives the ratio of probability of
selecting a non-member to a member. This allows the PPV metric to better capture the privacy threat
across different settings. Figure 3a shows the effect of varying the false positive rate α and Figure 3b
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shows the effect of varying the prior distribution probability γ on the PPV metric. For example, for
 = 5, δ = 10−5, α = 0.01, γ = 100, the advantage metric can be as high as 0.98, while the PPV
metric is close to 0.5 (i.e., coin toss probability). Thus, in such scenarios, membership advantage
grossly overestimates the privacy threat.
4 Inference Attacks
While the previous section covers the metrics to evaluate privacy leakage, here we discuss about
the membership inference attack procedures. In Section 4.1, we describe our threshold selection
procedure for threshold-based inference attacks. Section 4.2 presents our threshold-based inference
attack that perturbs a query record and uses the direction of change in per-instance loss of the record
for membership inference.
4.1 Setting the Decision Threshold
The membership inference attacks we consider need to output a Boolean result for each test, converting
a real number measure from a test into a Boolean that indicates whether or not a given input is
considered a member. The effectiveness of an attack depends critically on the value of this decision
threshold.
We propose a simple procedure to select the decision threshold for any threshold-based attack, which
allows the adversary to achieve as much privacy leakage as possible while limited to an expected
maximum false positive rate:
Procedure 4.1 (Finding Decision Threshold). Given an adversary, A, that knows information about
a target model including the training data distribution D, training set size n, training procedure,
and model architecture, as well as knowing the prior distribution probability p for the suspected
membership set, this procedure finds a threshold φ that maximizes the privacy leakage of the sampled
data points for a given maximum false positive rate α.
1. Sample a training data set S¯ ∼ Dn for training a modelMS¯ .
2. Randomly sample b ∈ {0, 1}, such that b = 1 with probability p.
3. Sample record z ∼ S¯ if b = 1, otherwise z ∼ D\S¯.
4. Output the decision threshold, φ, that maximizes its true positive rate constrained to a
maximum false positive rate of α for the inference attack, A(z,MS¯ , n,D, φ).
Note that in comparison to Experiment 3.1, the adversaryA takes an additional parameter φ here. With
this φ, the adversary can query the target modelMS to perform membership inference. Procedure 4.1
works for any threshold-based inference attack where an adversary knows the data distribution and
model training process well enough to train its own models similar to the target model.
Application to Yeom’s Attack. The membership inference attack of Yeom et al. [2018] is one such
attack that can benefit from using our threshold selection procedure. As originally designed, the attack
uses per-instance loss information for membership inference. Given a loss `(z,MS) on the query
record z, their approach classifies it as a member if the loss is less than the expected training loss.
Using our Procedure 4.1, we can instead use a threshold φ for membership inference that corresponds
to an expected maximum false positive rate α. In other words, if the per-instance loss `(z,MS) ≤ φ,
then z is classified as a member of the target model’s training set S, otherwise it is classified as a
non-member. We refer to this membership inference adversary as Yeom.
4.2 Merlin
As discussed above, Procedure 4.1 can be used on any threshold-based inference attack. Here, we
introduce a new threshold-based membership inference attack called Merlin1 that uses a different
approach to infer membership. Instead of the per-instance loss of a record, this method uses the
1Backronym for MEasuring Relative Loss In Neighborhood.
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Algorithm 1: Inference Using Direction of Change in Per-Instance Loss
1 A(z,MS , n,D, φ):
Input :z: input record,MS : model trained on data set S of size n, D: data distribution, φ:
decision function, T : number of repeat, σ: standard deviation parameter
Output :membership prediction of z (0 or 1)
2 count← 0 ;
3 for T runs do
4 ξ ∼ N (0, σ2I) ; // Sample Gaussian noise
5 if `(z+ ξ,MS) > `(z,MS) then
6 count← count+ 1 ;
7 end
8 end
9 return count ≥ φ ; // 1 if ‘member’
Data set #Features #Classes Train Acc Test Acc PPV at γ = 1 PPV at γ = 10
Purchase-100X 600 100 1.00 0.71 90.11± 3.32 55.92± 13.32
Texas-100 6,000 100 1.00 0.53 90.93± 9.10 (insufficient data)
RCV1X 2,000 52 1.00 0.84 98.00± 2.53 81.23± 6.28
Table 2: Summary of data sets and results for non-private models. Maximum PPV achieved by Merlin
is reported in percentage (averaged across five runs).
direction of change in per-instance loss of the record when it is perturbed with a small amount of
noise. The intuition here is that due to overfitting, the target model’s loss on a training set record will
tend to be close to a local minimum, so the loss at perturbed points near the original input will be
higher. On the other hand, the loss is equally likely to either increase or decrease for a non-member
record.
Algorithm 1 describes the attack procedure. For a query record z, random Gaussian noise with zero
mean and standard deviation σ is added and the change of loss direction is recorded. This step is
repeated T times and the count is incremented each time the per-instance loss of the perturbed record
increases. Though we use Gaussian noise, the algorithm works for other noise distributions as well.
We also tried uniform distribution and observed similar results, but with different σ values. Both
the parameters T and σ can be pre-tuned on a hold-out set to maximize the attacker’s distinguishing
power and fixed for the entire attack process. In our experiments, we find T = 100 and σ = 0.01
work well across all data sets. Finally, the query record z is classified as a member when count ≥ φ,
where φ is a threshold that could be set by Procedure 4.1.
5 Experimental Setup
This section describes the data sets and models used, along with the training procedure and hyperpa-
rameter settings. Table 2 summarizes the data sets used and the performance of non-private model
trained over each data set. In the balanced prior setting (γ = 1), members are identified with high
confidence (> 90% PPV) for all the test data sets. The membership inference decreases drastically in
the imbalanced prior case, when γ = 10. Discussion of the results is deferred to Sections 6 and 7.
Data sets. Prior works on both black-box [Shokri et al., 2017, Yeom et al., 2018] and white-box [Nasr
et al., 2019] membership inference attacks have shown that multi-class classification tasks are more
vulnerable to membership inference. Hence, we select three multi-class classification tasks. Although
the three data sets we analyze are public, they are representative of data sets that contain potentially
sensitive information about individuals.
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Figure 4: Accuracy loss comparison of private models trained with different privacy analyses.
– Purchase-100X: Shokri et al. [2017] created Purchase-100 data set by extracting customer transac-
tions from Kaggle’s acquire valued customers challenge Competition [2014]. The authors arbitrarily
selected 600 items from the transactions data and considered only those customers who purchased
at least one of the 600 items. Their resulting data set consisted of 197,000 customer records with
600 binary features representing the customer purchase history. Shokri et al. artificially clustered
these records into 100 classes, each representing a unique purchase style, such that the goal is to
predict a customer’s purchase style. Since we needed more records for our experiments with the
γ = 10 setting, we curated our own data set by following the same procedure. We took the 600
most frequently purchased items and ended up with around 300,000 customer records. We call this
expanded dataset the Purchase-100X data set.
– Texas-100: We use the Texas hospital data set used by Shokri et al. [2017]. It consists of 67,000
patient records with 6,000 binary features where each feature represents a patient’s medical attribute.
This data set also has a 100 output classes where the task is to identify the main procedure that
was performed on the patient. This data set is too small for tests with high γ settings, but a useful
benchmark for the other settings.
– RCV1X: The Reuters RCV1 corpus dataset [Lewis et al., 2004] is a collection of Reuters newswire
articles with more than 800,000 documents, a 47,0000-word vocabulary and 103 classes. The original
103 classes are arranged in a hierarchical manner, and each article can belong to more than one class.
We follow data preprocessing procedures similar to Srivastava et al. [2014] to obtain a dataset such
that each article only belongs to a single class. The final dataset we use has 420,000 articles, 2,000
most frequent words represented by their term frequencyinverse document frequency (TFIDF) which
are used as features and 52 classes. We call our expanded dataset RCV1X.
All the above data sets are pre-processed such that the `2 norm of each record is bounded by 1. This
is a standard pre-processing procedure that improves model performance that is used by many prior
works [Chaudhuri et al., 2011, Jayaraman et al., 2018].
Model architecture. We train neural networks with two hidden layers with ReLU activation. Each
hidden layer has 256 neurons and the output layer is a softmax layer. Similar multi-layer ReLU
network architectures have been used to analyze privacy-preserving deep learning methods in several
previous works [Shokri and Shmatikov, 2015, Abadi et al., 2016, Shokri et al., 2017]. Table 2 reports
the training and test accuracy of non-private models across the three data sets. As with all of the
experimental results we report in this paper, the results are averaged over five runs such that the
target model is trained from the scratch for each run. The non-private models for all three data sets
achieve 100% training accuracy, but there is a considerable gap between the training and test accuracy.
This generalization gap indicates that the model is overfitting the training data, and hence, there is
information in the model that could be exploited in a membership inference attack.
Hyperparameters. For each data set, the training set is fixed to 10,000 randomly sampled records
and the test set size is varied to reflect different prior probability distributions. For uniform prior
(p = 0.5, γ = 1), we sample 10,000 random records from the remaining data set. For the case of
non-uniform prior, we sample γ times the number of training set records to create the test data set.
We are most interested in the case where γ > 1, as it more closely reflects the reality. For both
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(b) Attack Performance with respect to φ.
Figure 5: Analysis of Yeom on non-private model trained on Purchase-100X with balanced prior. The
x-axis shows the per-instance loss on a logarithmic scale from 10−7 to 101 where the buckets are in
the range (10−7, 10−6.9), (10−6.9, 10−6.8), and so on up to (100.9, 101).
Purchase-100X and RCV1X data sets, we use γ = 2 (p ≈ 0.333) and γ = 10 (p ≈ 0.091). For
Texas-100, we only use γ = 2 since it is too small for experiments with larger γ.
For training the models, we use the Adam optimizer and perform grid search to find the best values
for hyperparameters such as batch size, learning rate, `2 penalty, clipping threshold and number of
iterations. We find batch size of 200 and `2 penalty of 10−8 to work the best across all the data sets.
For Purchase-100X and Texas-100, we use learning rate of 0.005 and gradient clipping threshold of 4;
for RCV1X, we use 0.003 learning rate and 1 gradient clipping threshold. We set the training epochs
to 100 for Purchase-100X, 30 for Texas-100, and 80 for RCV1X. We fix the differential privacy failure
parameter δ as 10−5 to keep it smaller than the inverse of the training set size, generally considered
the maximum acceptable value for δ. For an in-depth analysis of hyperparameter tuning on private
learning, see Abadi et al. [2016].
Attacks. To study privacy leakage, we perform the two threshold-based membership inference attacks
described in Section 4. The first attack, which we refer to as Yeom, uses a threshold on per-instance
loss of a given record [Yeom et al., 2018]. The second attack, Merlin, is our proposed approach that
uses a threshold on loss direction (see Algorithm 1). The Merlin attack requires tuning the number of
repetitions T and noise magnitude σ used in Algorithm 1. Higher values of T usually leads to better
membership distinguishability, up to a certain level, but at the cost of computational overhead. We
find T = 100 to work reasonably well. Merlin’s performance is quite sensitive to σ values. We vary σ
between 0.001 and 1 and find σ = 0.01 to be optimal for Gaussian distribution.
Private Model Training. We evaluate the model accuracy of private neural network models trained
on different data sets. We vary the privacy budget  between 0.1 and 100 for differential private
training and repeat the experiments five times for all the settings to report the average results.
We report the accuracy loss metric which gives the relative loss in test accuracy of private models
with respect to non-private baseline. The formula for calculating this metric is:
Accuracy Loss = 1− Accuracy of Private Model
Accuracy of Non-Private Model
.
Figure 4 gives the accuracy loss of differentially private models trained on different data sets with
varying privacy budgets. The private models are trained using the gradient perturbation mechanism
where the gradients at each epoch are clipped and Gaussian noise is added to preserve privacy.
The privacy accounting for composition of mechanisms is done via both Gaussian differential
privacy [Dong et al., 2019] (GDP) and the prior state-of-the-art Re´nyi differential privacy [Mironov,
2017] (RDP). As shown in the figure, the GDP mechanism has a lower accuracy loss for  ≤ 10 due
to its tighter privacy analysis. The GDP composition theorem requires that the individual mechanisms
be highly private, and hence it is hard to reduce noise for  > 10 without increasing the failure
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α (%) φ AdvA (%) PPVA (%)
Yeom
Fixed FPR 1.00 - - -
Min FPR 10.00 0 2.13± 0.18 54.72± 0.44
Fixed φ - (1.04± 0.07)× 10−4 35.18± 0.69 68.69± 0.33
Max PPVA 36.00 (4.12± 0.25)× 10−4 61.03± 0.50 73.30± 0.12
Max AdvA 38.00 (6.49± 0.28)× 10−4 62.17± 0.22 72.84± 0.08
Yeom
CBT
Min FPR 0.01 (0, 0, 0) 0.21± 0.14 71.30± 5.45
Fixed FPR 1.00 (0, 0, 0) 0.21± 0.14 71.30± 5.45
Fixed φ - (0.21, 0.82, 1.63)× 10−4 33.19± 2.06 67.72± 0.70
Max PPVA 52.00 (0.79, 4.58, 12.84)× 10−4 61.48± 0.32 73.07± 0.30
Max AdvA 57.00 (0.97, 4.91, 15.38)× 10−4 61.80± 0.29 73.04± 0.29
Merlin
Min FPR 0.01 (87.60± 1.20)/100 0.12± 0.07 87.02± 9.59
Max PPVA 0.10 (84.40± 0.49)/100 0.46± 0.09 90.11± 3.32
Fixed FPR 1.00 (78.20± 0.40)/100 2.75± 0.22 82.27± 0.84
Max AdvA 30.00 (60.40± 0.49)/100 20.33± 0.66 63.13± 0.80
Table 3: Thresholds selected against non-private models trained on Purchase-100X with balanced
prior. The results are averaged over five runs such that the target model is trained from the scratch for
each run. Yeom CBT uses class-based thresholds, where φ shows the triplet of minimum, median and
maximum thresholds across all classes.
Texas-100 RCV1X
α (%) AdvA (%) PPVA (%) α (%) AdvA (%) PPVA (%)
Yeom
Fixed FPR 1.00 - - 1.00 - -
Min FPR 5.00 2.33± 0.22 60.13± 0.94 41.00 6.15± 3.19 53.27± 1.28
Fixed φ - 52.66± 4.56 75.85± 1.15 - 27.45± 2.21 58.22± 0.56
Max PPVA 26.00 62.22± 5.49 77.15± 1.04 67.00 26.57± 3.96 58.14± 0.85
Max AdvA 30.00 66.81± 3.60 76.38± 0.63 69.00 26.81± 3.29 58.08± 0.68
Merlin
Min FPR 0.03 0.21± 0.22 90.93± 9.10 0.01 0.22± 0.13 98.00± 2.53
Max PPVA 0.03 0.21± 0.22 90.93± 9.10 0.01 0.22± 0.13 98.00± 2.53
Fixed FPR 1.00 6.10± 1.13 88.08± 2.88 1.00 2.74± 1.09 79.95± 1.75
Max AdvA 36.00 38.69± 1.23 67.59± 0.48 25.00 11.95± 1.33 60.20± 0.81
Table 4: Comparing membership inference attacks on non-private models across Texas-100 and
RCV1X for balanced prior.
probability δ. For all three data sets, GDP performs better than RDP on an average and hence we
only report the results for GDP in the remaining experiments.
6 Threshold Selection
In this section, we evaluate our threshold selection procedure (Procedure 4.1) for both inference
attacks. We first consider the Yeom attack, and show that our threshold selection procedure can
be used to obtain thresholds that achieve particular attacker goals, such as maximizing the PPV or
membership advantage metric, or minimizing the false positive rate. Next, we evaluate the Merlin
attack using the same threshold selection procedure and show that it achieves higher PPV metric
compared to Yeom. Finally we evaluate the effectiveness of these attacks on differentially private
models. For this section, we only consider a balanced prior distribution, as was done in previous
work. We defer the results for scenarios with imbalanced priors to Section 7.
6.1 Yeom Attack
The Yeom attack uses a fixed threshold on per-instance loss for membership inference test, such that
the query record is classified as a member if its per-instance loss is less than the threshold. We show
that the adversary can achieve better privacy leakage, specific to particular attack goals, by using our
threshold selection procedure to choose a relevant threshold.
12
Results on Purchase-100X. We begin by showing the distribution of per-instance loss of members
and non-members for a non-private model trained on the Purchase-100X data set in Figure 5a.
Per-instance losses of member records are concentrated close to zero, and most of the loss values
are less than 0.001. Whereas for non-member records, the loss values are spread across the range.
This suggests that a larger fraction of members will be correctly identified by the attacker with
high precision (PPV) for loss thresholds less than 0.001, and hence the privacy leakage will be high.
Another notable observation is that 1000.40±34.28 non-members have zero loss across five runs, and
hence the minimum achievable false positive rate is 10%. This is reflected in Figure 5b which shows
the effect of selecting different loss threshold values on the privacy leakage metrics. An attacker can
use our threshold selection procedure to choose a loss threshold to meet specific attack goals, such as
minimizing the false positive rate (Min FPR), or achieving a fixed false positive rate (Fixed FPR), or
maximizing either of the privacy leakage metrics (Max PPVA and Max AdvA). Table 3 summarizes
these scenarios and compares their thresholds with the threshold selected by the method of Yeom
et al. (Fixed φ). For Fixed FPR, we consider an attacker with a false positive rate of 1% (α = 1%).
The attacker uses Procedure 4.1 to find loss threshold φ corresponding to α = 1%, which it uses for
membership inference on the target set. However, since the minimum achievable false positive rate
for Yeom on Purchase-100X is 10%, this attack fails to find a suitable threshold. For maximizing
PPV or membership advantage, the attacker can use the threshold selection procedure with varying
α values and choose the threshold φ that maximizes the required privacy metric. In comparison,
Fixed φ uses a fixed threshold of expected training loss which does not necessarily maximize the
privacy leakage. As the results in the table demonstrate, the Yeom attack achieves better privacy
leakage when thresholds are chosen using our threshold selection procedure.
Results on other data sets. While we observe similar trends of privacy leakage corresponding to
the selected thresholds for Texas-100 and RCV1X data sets, we discuss the notable differences in the
results for these data sets. Table 4 compares the performance of Yeom against non-private models
across Texas-100 and RCV1X. We note that Yeom can achieve false positive rates as low as 5% on
Texas-100. In general, the attack performance on this data set is comparable to that of Purchase-100X.
Appendix A provides more details on the Texas-100 results. For RCV1X, the attack success rate is
substantially lower than that for the other data sets (see Table 4). This is because, unlike the other
two data sets which have 100 classes, RCV1X is a 52-class classification task. As shown by prior
works [Song, 2017, Yeom et al., 2018], success of membership inference attack is proportional to the
complexity of classification task. We further note that the maximum PPV that can be achieved by
Yeom on RCV1X is only around 58%, at which point the membership advantage is close to 28%. This
gives credence to our claim that membership advantage should not be solely relied on as a measure
of inference risk. While membership advantage can be high, the privacy leakage is negligible for
balanced priors when the PPV is close to 50%. Later in Section 7 we show that this phenomenon
is prevalent across all data sets when the prior is imbalanced. Appendix B covers more detailed
discussion on the RCV1X results.
Using class-based thresholds. Recently, Song and Mittal [2020] demonstrated that the approach of
Yeom et al. [2018] can be further improved by using class-based thresholds instead of one global
threshold on loss values. We implement this approach, using our threshold setting algorithm to
independently set the threshold for each class (referred as Yeom CBT). This enables finding class-
based thresholds corresponding to smaller α values, as seen for the minimum FPR (α = 0.01) and
fixed FPR (α = 1) cases for Purchase-100X in Table 3. Nonetheless, the maximum PPV still does
not exceed that of Yeom. We observe similar results for Texas-100 (reported in Appendix A) and
RCV1X (Appendix B).
6.2 Merlin Attack
Next, we perform inference attacks using the Merlin (Algorithm 1) where the attacker perturbs a
record with random Gaussian noise of magnitude σ = 0.01 and notes the direction of change in loss.
This process is repeated T = 100 times and the attacker infers the membership of the record based
on the number of times the loss increases out of 100 trials. More concretely, if the loss increases
more than a threshold number of times, then the record is classified as a member. As with the Yeom
experiments, we use Procedure 4.1 to select a suitable threshold.
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(b) Attack Performance with respect to φ.
Figure 6: Analysis of Merlin on non-private model trained on Purchase-100X with balanced prior.
Yeom Merlin
 α (%) φ Max PPVA (%) α (%) φ (out of 100) Max PPVA (%)
1 4.00 0.45± 0.04 57.27± 1.37 2.00 78.20± 0.40 53.57± 1.26
10 15.00 (8.50± 0.80)× 10−3 60.47± 0.51 2.00 77.60± 0.49 59.10± 1.64
100 27.00 (1.48± 0.12)× 10−3 61.10± 0.33 0.30 82.60± 0.49 63.82± 4.62
Table 5: Membership inference attacks against private models trained on Purchase-100X data set
with balanced prior.
Results on Purchase-100X. Figure 6a shows the distribution of loss direction counts for member
and non-member records for a non-private model trained on the Purchase-100X data set. The loss
increases 56.77± 16.74 times out of 100 trials on an average for member records, whereas for the
non-member records the loss increases 51.84± 15.58 times on an average. Thus, the attacker can
identify more member records with high precision when it chooses a threshold greater than 56. A
peculiar observation is that the loss direction count is zero for a considerable fraction of members and
non-members. For the non-member records, the loss is very high to begin with and hence it always
decreases on adding noise. Whereas for the member records with zero count, the loss value does not
change even with addition of noise. As mentioned in step 5 of Algorithm 1, we only check if the loss
increases upon perturbation since we believe that equality is not a strong indicator of membership.
Figure 6b shows the attack performance with varying thresholds. As shown, Merlin can achieve much
higher PPV than Yeom. Table 3 summarizes the thresholds selected by Merlin with different attack
goals and compares the performance with Yeom. While Yeom can only achieve a minimum false
positive rate of 10% on this data set, Merlin can achieve false positive rate as low as 0.01%. Thus
Merlin is successful at a fixed false positive rate of 1% where Yeom fails. Another notable observation
is that Merlin can achieve close to 90% PPV while the maximum possible PPV achievable via Yeom
is around 73%. Thus, this attack is more suitable for scenarios where attack precision is preferred.
Results on other data sets. Table 4 compares the membership inference attack performance against
non-private models across Texas-100 and RCV1X. The Merlin attack allows for thresholds correspond-
ing to smaller false positive rates and consistently achieves higher PPV than Yeom across all the
data sets. Merlin is more successful on Texas-100 compared to Purchase-100X, as the gap between
loss direction distribution of member records and non-member records is high for Texas-100 (see
Appendix A for more analysis). More surprisingly, while Yeom is less successful on RCV1X, we find
that Merlin still manages to achieve a very high PPV (See Table 4). Thus, Merlin poses privacy threat
even in scenarios where Yeom fails. Appendix B provides details on the RCV1X results.
Using class-based thresholds. We also tried class-based thresholds for Merlin, like we did for Yeom.
However, we found that this approach does not benefit Merlin as the individual classes do not have
significant number of records to provide meaningful thresholds. By using class based threshold,
the maximum achievable PPV for Merlin reduced from around 90.11% to 84.55%, meanwhile the
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(b) Attack Performance with respect to φ.
Figure 7: Analysis of Yeom on private model trained with  = 100 at γ = 1 (Purchase-100X).
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Figure 8: Analysis of Merlin on private model trained with  = 100 at γ = 1 (Purchase-100X).
advantage metric increased from 0.46% to 2.99%. We observed similar behaviour across different
thresholds.
6.3 Impact of Privacy Noise
We also evaluated membership inference attacks against the private models and found no threshold
that appears to pose a serious privacy threat against these models. Similar to the experiments with
non-private models, here also we repeat the experiments five times and report the averaged results.
In each run, we train the private model from the scratch and perform the attack procedure on it.
Table 5 compares the maximum PPV achieved by Yeom and Merlin attacks against private models
trained on Purchase-100X with varying privacy budgets. As expected, the privacy leakage increases
with increase in privacy budget. However the privacy threat is not significant as the PPV is close to
60% even for  = 100, a privacy budget large enough to provide no meaningful theoretical privacy
guarantee.
To understand how the privacy noise is impacting the attack success, we plot the loss distribution of
member and non-member records for a private model trained with  = 100 in Figure 7a. The figure
shows that the noise reduces the gap between the two distributions when compared to Figure 5a with
no privacy. Hence differential privacy limits the success of Yeom by spreading out the loss values
for both member and non-member distributions. Though in doing so, it also reduces the number of
non-member records with zero loss from 1000.40± 34.28 (in non-private case) to 121.60± 22.02.
This reduces the minimum achievable false positive rate to 0.01%, and hence allows the attacker to
set α thresholds smaller than 10% against private models which wasn’t possible in the non-private
case. However the PPV is still less than 60% for these thresholds. Figure 7b shows the attack
performance at different thresholds. Due to the reduced gap between the member and non-member
loss distributions, the PPV is close to 60% across all loss thresholds even if the maximum membership
advantage is considerable (close to 20% for  = 100). Thus even with small privacy noise, the privacy
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Max PPVA of Yeom (%) Max PPVA of Merlin (%)
γ Purchase-100X Texas-100 RCV1X Purchase-100X Texas-100 RCV1X
1 73.30± 0.12 77.15± 1.04 58.14± 0.85 90.11± 3.32 90.93± 9.10 98.00± 2.53
2 57.86± 0.38 61.52± 1.85 42.02± 0.44 84.91± 13.88 83.38± 8.70 97.10± 1.83
10 21.25± 0.28 - 12.59± 0.36 55.92± 13.32 - 81.23± 6.28
Table 6: Effect of varying γ on PPV metric against non-private models.
leakage risk is significantly mitigated. We observe similar trends across the other two data sets and
hence defer these results to Appendix A and B.
Next, we plot the performance of Merlin on a private model trained with  = 100. Figure 8a shows
the distribution of loss direction counts for member and non-member records. When compared to the
corresponding distribution for a non-private model (see Figure 6a), the gap between the distributions
is greatly reduced. This restricts the privacy leakage across all thresholds, as shown in Figure 8b.
We note that the PPV in the figure goes to zero for the threshold corresponding to the minimum
false positive rate. This is because PPV drastically fluctuates between 0 and 1 across all five runs for
minimum FPR, and we do not cherry pick a run to report. The PPV is 1 for two out of five runs and 0
for the other runs. We observe similar trends for Merlin on the other two data sets, and hence defer
their results to the appendices. In conclusion, none of the attacks pose a meaningful privacy threat
against differentially private models, even when privacy budget is as large as  = 100.
7 Imbalanced Scenarios
As discussed in Section 3, the membership advantage metric does not capture the prior distribution
probability and hence gives a false sense of privacy threat for imbalanced prior settings where γ > 1.
In this section, we provide empirical evidence that the PPV metric captures privacy leakage more
naturally in imbalanced prior settings, and hence is a more reliable metric for evaluating the privacy
leakage.
In the imbalanced prior setting, the pool from which the attacker samples records for inference testing
has γ times more non-member records than members. In other words, the attacker is γ times more
likely to randomly pick a non-member than a member record for testing. For this experimental setting,
we set γ as high as the data set allows, such that the training set is fixed to 10,000 records as in the
previous experiments but the test set size is γ times the training set size. As discussed in Section 5, we
constructed expanded versions of the Purchase-100 and RCV1 datasets to enable these experiments.
Both the Purchase-100X and RCV1X data sets have more than 200,000 records, and hence are large
enough to allow setting γ = 10. We did not have source data to expand Texas-100, so are left with
a data set with only 67,000 records and hence only have results for γ = 2. The threshold selection
procedure (Procedure 4.1) uses holdout training and test sets that are disjoint from the target training
and test sets mentioned above, so the data set has to have at least (γ + 1)× 20, 000 records to run the
experiments.
Table 6 shows the effect of varying γ on the maximum PPV of membership inference attacks against
non-private models trained on different data sets. We can see a clear drop in PPV values across all
data sets with increasing γ values. The maximum PPV drops by around 10 - 15% on an average
between γ = 1 and γ = 2. For γ = 2, the maximum PPV of Yeom is close to 60%, whereas
Merlin still achieves a comparatively higher PPV of around 84%. Hence, Merlin still poses some
privacy threat at γ = 2. However, as the γ value increases to 10, none of the attacks are successful.
Though we note that Merlin is still somewhat successful on RCV1X at γ = 10. On the other hand, the
membership advantage values remain more or less the same across different γ values for both Yeom
and Merlin on Purchase-100X, as shown in Figure 9. We observe the same trend for Texas-100 and
RCV1X. Plots for these data sets are found in the appendix (Figures 14 and 19). These results support
our claim that PPV is a more reliable metric in imbalanced prior scenarios.
None of the attacks pose a privacy threat in the imbalanced prior settings where γ values are higher
than 10. In many practical scenarios, we would expect the γ to be much higher, in which case the
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(a) Yeom performance at γ = 2.
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(b) Yeom performance at γ = 10.
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(c) Merlin performance at γ = 2.
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(d) Merlin performance at γ = 10.
Figure 9: Attack performance on Purchase-100X for imbalanced prior setting.
membership inference attacks would be even less likely to succeed. Balanced priors is the best case
scenario for a membership inference adversary to show high privacy leakage, but also a setting where
the actual risk of being identified as a member is likely to be low since half the population under
consideration are expected to be members. Since the private models are not vulnerable to inference
attacks in the balanced prior setting, we conclude that they will not be vulnerable in the imbalanced
prior setting as well, where γ > 1. Hence we do not show the membership inference attack results
against private models.
8 Conclusion
Understanding privacy risks for machine learning poses considerable challenges, and there remains
a large gap between what can be guaranteed and the effectiveness of attacks in practice. In this
work, we introduce a novel threshold selection procedure that allows adversaries to choose inference
thresholds specific to their attack goals, and demonstrate a new membership inference attack, Merlin,
that outperforms previous attacks in the settings that matter the most. From experiments on three
real world data sets under different prior distribution settings, we find that although the non-private
models are highly vulnerable in the balanced prior setting, even a small amount of privacy noise
mitigates the privacy risk. Even with the improved attack, however, our results show no evidence of
privacy risk in imbalanced prior scenarios, even when no privacy mechanisms are used.
While membership inference has been shown to be a serious threat in balanced prior settings, our
results show that this is not the case under more realistic assumptions where only a small fraction
of the candidate population is included in the training data. These results raise doubts about the
practicality of membership inference attacks for most settings, but do not mean that other privacy
threats are not present. For instance, attribute inference attacks are more prominent privacy threats,
where skewed priors for sensitive attribute values are not uncommon. Moreover, our results show
that there is negligible membership inference risk on average, but do not dismiss the possibility
that certain subpopulation could be at risk. We hope our work encourages further research into
understanding more realistic settings for inference attacks, and developing meaningful privacy-utility
trade-offs for these scenarios.
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A Results for Texas-100
We recall that Texas-100 is a 100 class classification data set consisting of patient health records
where the class label identifies the type of major procedure the patient underwent. Hence the privacy
risk is significant for this data set as a successful membership inference would reveal that a particular
person was admitted as a patient and underwent a medical procedure.
A.1 Non-private models trained on Texas-100
As with Purchase-100X, we plot the distribution of per-instance loss of member and non-member
records for a non-private model trained on Texas-100 data set (see Figure 10a). A notable difference
is that the number of non-member records having zero loss is lower than that of Purchase-100X. As
a result, the false positive rate can be as low as 5% for this data set. This is depicted in Figure 10b
which shows the performance of Yeom against a non-private model at different thresholds. The trend
is similar to what we observe for Purchase-100X data set.
Figure 11a shows the distribution of loss direction counts of members and non-members for Merlin
against a non-private model trained on Texas-100 data set. The gap between the member and non-
member distributions is greater than that of Purchase-100X and hence this attack is more effective on
this data set. An important indicator for this is that almost none of the member records have zero
count whereas 613.00± 36.89 non-member records have zero count. Thus for this data set, the loss
of member records almost always increase when perturbed with small noise. On an average the loss
increases 80.95± 11.68 out of 100 times for member records whereas it increases 64.59± 21.69 out
of 100 times for non-member records. Figure 11b shows the performance of Merlin on non-private
model trained on Texas-100 data set at different count thresholds. Though the threshold values are
different, but the trend is similar to what we observed for Purchase-100X data set. These results
further validate the effectiveness of selecting a good threshold based on our proposed procedure.
Table 7 compares the membership inference attacks across different attack settings on Texas-100. As
shown, Merlin achieves much higher PPV values than Yeom. An interesting observation is that using
class based thresholds drastically improves PPV values for Yeom. While Yeom CBT achieves higher
PPV than Merlin on an average, we note that Merlin has high variance and can achieve up to 100%
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α (%) φ AdvA (%) PPVA (%)
Yeom
Fixed FPR 1.00 - - -
Min FPR 5.00 0 2.33± 0.22 60.13± 0.94
Fixed φ - (3.85± 6.67)× 10−3 52.66± 4.56 75.85± 1.15
Max PPVA 26.00 (1.50± 0.05)× 10−3 62.22± 5.49 77.15± 1.04
Max AdvA 30.00 (4.35± 0.25)× 10−3 66.81± 3.60 76.38± 0.63
Yeom
CBT
Min FPR 0.03 (0, 2.57× 10−6, 2.38× 10−2) 9.26± 0.86 93.45± 0.36
Fixed FPR 1.00 (0, 3.22× 10−6, 2.38× 10−2) 10.28± 1.27 92.58± 0.18
Fixed φ - (0.12, 5.1, 30.1)× 10−4 48.15± 5.02 76.76± 1.27
Max PPVA 0.03 (0, 2.57× 10−6, 2.38× 10−2) 9.26± 0.86 93.45± 0.36
Max AdvA 66.00 (3.50× 10−6, 3.71× 10−3, 8.22) 66.82± 3.57 76.76± 0.39
Merlin
Min FPR 0.03 (99.80± 0.40)/100 0.21± 0.22 90.93± 9.10
Max PPVA 0.03 (99.80± 0.40)/100 0.21± 0.22 90.93± 9.10
Fixed FPR 1.00 (95.20± 0.40)/100 6.10± 1.13 88.08± 2.88
Max AdvA 36.00 (75.60± 0.49)/100 38.69± 1.23 67.59± 0.48
Table 7: Thresholds selected against non-private models trained on Texas-100 with balanced prior.
The results are averaged over five runs such that the target model is trained from the scratch for each
run. Yeom CBT uses class-based thresholds, where φ shows the triplet of minimum, median and
maximum thresholds across all classes.
Yeom Merlin
 α (%) φ Max PPVA (%) α (%) φ (out of 100) Max PPVA (%)
1 10.00 1.19± 0.02 51.48± 0.56 1.00 88.40± 0.49 53.93± 1.71
10 21.00 (3.68± 0.31)× 10−1 53.80± 0.45 6.00 84.40± 0.49 56.37± 1.46
100 21.00 (1.25± 0.08)× 10−1 54.94± 0.19 7.00 85.00± 0.00 57.68± 0.91
Table 8: Membership inference attacks against private models trained on Texas-100 data set with
balanced prior.
PPV in some runs. As with Purchase-100X, we observe no benefit of using class based thresholds for
Merlin.
A.2 Private models trained on Texas-100
Table 8 compares the maximum PPV achieved by Yeom and Merlin attacks against private models
trained on Texas-100 with varying privacy budgets. As expected, the privacy leakage increases with
increase in privacy budget. However the privacy threat is not significant as the PPV is less than 60%
even for a large privacy budget  = 100, where there is no theoretical privacy guarantee.
To show how the privacy noise is impacting the attack success, we plot the loss distribution of member
and non-member records for a private model trained with  = 100 in Figure 12a. The figure shows
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(b) Attack Performance with respect to φ.
Figure 10: Analysis of Yeom on non-private model trained on Texas-100 with balanced prior.
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(b) Attack Performance with respect to φ.
Figure 11: Analysis of Merlin on non-private model trained on Texas-100 with balanced prior.
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(b) Attack Performance with respect to φ.
Figure 12: Analysis of Yeom on private model trained with  = 100 at γ = 1 (Texas-100).
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(b) Attack Performance with respect to φ.
Figure 13: Analysis of Merlin on private model trained with  = 100 at γ = 1 (Texas-100).
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(a) Yeom performance at γ = 2.
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(b) Merlin performance at γ = 2.
Figure 14: Attack performance on Texas-100 for imbalanced prior setting.
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α (%) φ AdvA (%) PPVA (%)
Yeom
Fixed FPR 1.00 - - -
Min FPR 41.00 0 6.15± 3.19 53.27± 1.28
Fixed φ - (2.15± 1.81)× 10−3 27.45± 2.21 58.22± 0.56
Max PPVA 67.00 (1.38± 1.59)× 10−3 26.57± 3.96 58.14± 0.85
Max AdvA 69.00 (2.17± 0.24)× 10−3 26.81± 3.29 58.08± 0.68
Yeom
CBT
Min FPR 0.01 (0, 0, 1.72)× 10−4 1.68± 0.80 93.76± 1.40
Max PPVA 0.01 (0, 0, 1.72)× 10−4 1.68± 0.80 93.76± 1.40
Fixed FPR 1.00 (0, 0, 1.72)× 10−4 1.78± 0.92 92.81± 5.63
Fixed φ - (0.18, 1.60, 92.1)× 10−3 20.97± 3.30 56.95± 0.56
Max AdvA 71.00 (0, 8.94× 10−3, 7.68) 24.41± 3.70 58.72± 1.10
Merlin
Min FPR 0.01 (97.00± 0.63)/100 0.22± 0.13 98.00± 2.53
Max PPVA 0.01 (97.00± 0.63)/100 0.22± 0.13 98.00± 2.53
Fixed FPR 1.00 (87.60± 1.02)/100 2.74± 1.09 79.95± 1.75
Max AdvA 25.00 (67.20± 0.40)/100 11.95± 1.33 60.20± 0.81
Table 9: Thresholds selected against non-private models trained on RCV1X with balanced prior. The
results are averaged over five runs such that the target model is trained from the scratch for each run.
Yeom CBT uses class-based thresholds, where φ shows the triplet of minimum, median and maximum
thresholds across all classes.
that the noise reduces the gap between the two distributions when compared to Figure 10a with no
privacy. Hence differential privacy limits the success of Yeom by spreading out the loss values for
both member and non-member distributions, as we saw in the case of Purchase-100X. Though in
doing so, it also reduces the number of non-member records with zero loss from 339.20± 33.47 (in
non-private case) to zero. This allows the attacker to set α thresholds smaller than 5% against private
models which wasn’t possible in the non-private case. However the PPV is still less than 55% for
these thresholds. Figure 12b shows the attack performance at different thresholds. While there is
high variance at smaller thresholds, on an average the maximum PPV is close to 55%. Thus even
with small privacy noise, the privacy leakage risk is significantly mitigated.
Next we plot the performance of Merlin on a private model trained with  = 100 in Figure 13.
Figure 13a shows the distribution of loss direction counts for member and non-member records.
When compared to the corresponding distribution for a non-private model (see Figure 11a), the gap
between the distributions is greatly reduced. This restricts the privacy leakage across all thresholds as
shown in Figure 13b.
A.3 Imbalanced prior setting for Texas-100
Since Texas-100 only has 67,000 records, we were only able test for γ = 2. Figure 14a shows the
performance of Yeom across different thresholds. When compared to Figure 10b, we can see a clear
drop in PPV values across all thresholds. Though the maximum PPV is still considerable enough to
pose privacy risk. In practice, we would observe much higher values of γ where these attacks would
fail, as shown for γ = 10 setting on Purchase-100X. As expected, the membership advantage remains
unchanged between balanced and imbalanced prior settings. Figure 14b shows the performance of
Merlin on Texas-100 at γ = 2 setting. We observe the same trend as that of Yeom. The membership
advantage values remain the same, while the PPV values decrease when compared to the balanced
prior setting. However, the maximum PPV can still go up to 90% for some runs. Thus, Merlin poses
greater privacy threat than Yeom.
B Results for RCV1X
RCV1X is a 52 class classification data set consisting of Reuters news articles belonging to one of the
52 disjoint groups of similar articles. Since the number of classes is less than the other two data sets,
we expect a lower attack success rate for this data set. This is in accordance with the findings of prior
works Song [2017], Yeom et al. [2018].
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(b) Attack Performance with respect to φ.
Figure 15: Analysis of Yeom on non-private model trained on RCV1X with balanced prior.
B.1 Non-private models trained on RCV1X
We plot the distribution of per-instance loss of members and non-members for a non-private model
trained on RCV1X in Figure 15a. While more members are concentrated closer to zero loss than
the non-members, we observe that the gap between the two distributions is not as large as with
the other two data sets. Moreover, 3628.60 ± 451.43 non-members have zero loss, and hence the
minimum possible false positive rate for Yeom is around 41% Figure 15b shows the performance
of Yeom for different loss thresholds. The maximum PPV that can be achieved using this attack
is only around 58%, at which point the membership advantage is close to 28%. Thus while the
membership advantage metric would suggest that there is privacy risk, we can see that Yeom does not
pose significant risk as PPV is close to 50% in the balanced prior setting.
Figure 16a shows the distribution of loss direction counts for a non-private model trained on RCV1X
data set. The gap between the member and non-member distributions is small, however the PPV is
still high with large thresholds, as depicted in Figure 16b. We repeat this experiment five times and
found that the attack can achieve a maximum PPV of around 98% on an average for threshold values
close to 97. Thus, Merlin poses privacy threat even in scenarios where Yeom fails.
Table 9 compares the membership inference attacks on RCV1X for different attack goals. The results
suggest that Yeom is benefited from using class based thresholds, as the maximum PPV jumps from
around 58% to around 93%. However, Merlin still outperforms Yeom CBT in terms of maximum
achievable PPV.
B.2 Private models trained on RCV1X
Table 10 compares the maximum PPV achieved by Yeom and Merlin attacks against private models
trained on RCV1X with varying privacy budgets. While the privacy leakage increases with increase in
privacy budget, neither of the attacks pose significant privacy threat. Although, Merlin still achieves
higher PPV than Yeom.
Figure 17a shows the loss distribution of member and non-member records for a private model trained
with  = 100. As shown, the gap between the two distributions is much lower when compared to
Figure 15a with no privacy. Figure 17b shows the attack performance at different thresholds. Due to
the reduced gap between the member and non-member loss distributions, the PPV is close to 50%
across all loss thresholds. Thus small privacy noise is sufficient to mitigate privacy leakage risk.
Next we plot the performance of Merlin on a private model trained with  = 100 in Figure 18.
Figure 18a shows the distribution of loss direction counts for member and non-member records.
When compared to the corresponding distribution for a non-private model (see Figure 16a), the gap
between the distributions is not even noticeable. However, the attack can still achieve PPV close to
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Figure 16: Analysis of Merlin on non-private model trained on RCV1X with balanced prior.
Yeom Merlin
 α (%) φ Max PPVA (%) α (%) φ (out of 100) Max PPVA (%)
1 20.00 (3.09± 0.69)× 10−3 51.09± 0.20 1.00 82.60± 0.49 52.99± 2.09
10 55.00 (7.93± 0.08)× 10−3 51.62± 0.09 1.00 83.40± 0.49 56.39± 6.55
100 65.00 (9.93± 0.88)× 10−3 52.77± 0.08 1.00 84.40± 0.49 62.70± 4.29
Table 10: Membership inference attacks against private models trained on RCV1X data set with
balanced prior.
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(b) Attack Performance with respect to φ.
Figure 17: Analysis of Yeom on private model trained with  = 100 at γ = 1 (RCV1X).
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(b) Attack Performance with respect to φ.
Figure 18: Analysis of Merlin on private model trained with  = 100 at γ = 1 (RCV1X).
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(a) Yeom performance at γ = 2.
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(b) Yeom performance at γ = 10.
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(c) Merlin performance at γ = 2.
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(d) Merlin performance at γ = 10.
Figure 19: Attack performance on RCV1X for imbalanced prior setting.
60% at higher thresholds as shown in Figure 18b. We conclude that Merlin does not pose any serious
privacy risk in this setting.
B.3 Imbalanced prior setting for RCV1X
Figure 19 shows the performance of membership inference attacks across different thresholds at
γ = 2 and γ = 10. As expected, the membership advantage remains unchanged for both the attacks
between γ = 2 and γ = 10, since it does not consider prior probability. Whereas, we can see a
drop in PPV values when we change γ from 2 to 10. The maximum achievable PPV for Yeom is
42.02± 0.44 at γ = 2 and 12.59± 0.36 at γ = 10 on an average across five runs. Thus, Yeom does
not pose any privacy threat against RCV1X data set for imbalanced priors. Whereas, Merlin still seems
to achieve high PPV values. We find that Merlin achieves maximum PPV of 97.10± 1.83 at γ = 2
and 81.23± 6.28 at γ = 10 on an average across five runs (as shown in Table 6). Thus, Merlin poses
some privacy threat even in scenarios where Yeom fails.
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